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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
00O00

GAYLA HATCH ANDERSON
Plainti ff/Respondent,
Case No. 860225
v.
MICHAEL HALL HATCH,
De fendant/Appe11 ant.
ooOoo
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
ooOoo
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a post-judgment proceeding in a divorce case
involving the interpretation of a provision in the Decree related
to use and possession of the marital residence and determination
and payment of sums representing equity in that residence.

Both

parties sought an interpretation of that provision from the trial
court.

Both the Domestic Commissioner and the Trial Court agreed

with Respondents position that she was entitled to retain
possession of the residence for herself and the minor child,
subject to her paying Appellant one-half of the equity in the
residence as of the date of the Decree.

The Trial Court rejected

Appellant's contention that upon the remarriage of Respondent, or
an attempt by her to sell the residence, he would be allowed to
purchase her share in the home for one-half of the equity in the
home as of the date of either of the two events described above.

It is from that ruling that Appellant brings this appeal claiming
that Paragraph 5 of the Decree supports his position; that the
doctrine of res; judicata prevents Respondent from prevailing; and
that an evidentiary hearing should have been held.

Respondent

claims that each of these arguments are simply without merit, and
requests that the decision of the Trial Court affirming the
decisions of the Domestic Relations Commissioner likewise be
affirmed by this Court.
STATEMENT_OF__FACTS
Because Appellant's Statement of Facts fails to mention
certain facts which are materially important to the determination
of this appeal, and has either over or under emphasized other
facts, Respondent wishes to provide her own statement of Facts
set forth below:
l^£-£IZ£H-ll£B£^l and events surrounding
tk£ PZ£P££^ii£B_-2l_i^£_slSn£^

^ilEHl^il£B-£Il^-.lll£-.?££^££-_£l_?iX££££ •
Plaintiff/Respondent, Gayla Hatch Anderson (Mrs. Hatch),
filed a Complaint for divorce against the Defendant/Appellant,
Michael Hall Hatch (Mr. Hatch), on July 17, 1975 (R.2-5).
Subsequently, the parties reached a Stipulation which dealt with,
among other things, the distribution of real and personal
property of the parties.

Mrs. Hatch's attorney drafted a

Stipulation which reflected the parties agreement (R.58).
included as Exhibit "A" in the Addendum to this Brief.
2b states that:

2

It is

Paragraph

Plaintiff may be awarded the use of the home and real
property located at 13227 South 2860 West, Riverton,
Utah, subject to the payment of the mortgage thereon,
unti 1 !he_occurrence_of[_one_
£^2ilB££B£l££* t o w * t : t h e remarriage of the Plaintiff,
the youngest child reaches majority, or Plaintiff
desires to sell said home , £l_whj[ch_ t^me_PJ. zint^ i_ j: _f
pursuant to an appraisal to be made forthwith and
determine the equity as of this date. Said appraisal
to be paid for by the Defendant, and the Defendant
shall have the option to purchase Plaintiff's equity on
the occurrence of any of the above contingencies in the
event Plaintiff does not purchase Defendant's equity,
said equity to be based on an appraisal and
determination as of the date of the occurrence of the
one of the above contingencies. In the event neither
party exercises the option to purchase said home, it
will be sold and Defendant would receive the equity
pursuant to the Decree of Divorce and the present
appraisal. (Emphasis added) (R.66-67).
This particular paragraph reflected Mrs. Hatch's intent that
she would have the first option to purchase Mr. Hatch's equity in
the parties' marital residence in the event one of the
contingencies occurred (R.58).

Mrs. Hatch expressed to her

counsel that she would not be willing to settle and agree to any
other type of arrangement in regard to the parties' marital
residence (R.58).
Defendant's counsel, Leland K. Wimmer, then retyped the
Stipulation submitted by Mrs. Hatch's attorney (R.15-16; R.58,
paragraphs 5 and 6; R.72, Affidavit of Leland Wimmer, paragraph
5 ) , a copy of which is included as Exhibit "B" in the Addendum to
this brief.

Paragraph 2b of Mr. Hatch's retyped Stipulation is

identical to Paragraph 2b of Mrs. Hatch's retyped Stipulation
with the exception of the provision regarding the occurrence of

3

the contingencies triggering an equity payout and provided as
follows:

£Pii2^i£_PH££ll£££--.£i£illiill^-_£SHiiy pursuant to the
appraisal to be made forthwith to deTermine the equity
as of this date, said appraisal to be paid for by
Defendant, and Plaintiff shall have the option to
purchase Defendants equity on the occurrence of any of
the above contingencies in the event Defendant does not
purchase Plaintiff's equity, said equity being based
upon an appraisal and determination as of the date of
the occurrence of one of the above contingencies,
(emphasis added) (It.15-16).
Mr. Wimmer's version of the Stipulation had several other
substantial differences from that Stipulation submitted by Mr.
Olsen.

For example, paragraph f of Mrs. Hatch's Stipulation

provides for child support in the amount of $150.00 per child,
per month for a total of $300.00.

Mr. Wimmer T s retyped

Stipulation revised this figure to $100.00 per child, per month.
Paragraph h of the original Stipulation provides that Mr. Hatch
is to maintain medical insurance and life insurance with the
minor children as beneficiaries and Mr. Wimmer, in the retyped
version, carries this provision forward with the additional
condition that both the health and life insurance be maintained
only so long as Mr. Hatch is employed through Operation
Engineers.

Also, Mrs. Hatch requested $350.00 additional

attorney's fee in paragraph i, whereas in paragraph j of Mr.
Wimmer's version, each party is to assume their own attorney's
fees and costs.

Finally, there is a provision in paragraph i of

Mr. Hatch's Stipulation that, "Plaintiff agrees to continue
existing marriage counseling", a provision that is not contained
4

in the original Stipulation submitted by Mr. Olsen.
This Stipulation, with the transposition of the words
"Plaintiff" and "Defendant" in Paragraph 2b was submitted to Mrs.
Hatch's counsel, signed and filed with the Court. (R.15-17, 58).
Mrs. Hatch was granted a Decree of Divorce on November 21,
1975, after a default hearing before the Honorable Stewart
Hansen, Jr. (R.20-22).

The Decree simply restated the terms of

the Stipulation which had been retyped and submitted by Mr.
Hatch's counsel, (R.15-17; R.20-22; R.73, paragraph 7).
Paragraph 5 of the Decree of Divorce, which was signed by
the Court, states as follows:
Plaintiff be, and she is hereby awarded the use
of the home and real property located at 13227 South
2860 West, Riverton, Utah, subject to the payment of
the mortgage thereon, until the occurrence of one of
the following contingencies, to wit: The remarriage of
plaintiff, the youngest child reaches majority, or
plaintiff desires to sell said home, at which time
defendant shall have first option to purchase
plaintiff's equity pursuant to an appraisal to be made
forthwith to determine the equity as of this date, said
appraisal to be paid for by defendant, and plaintiff
shall have the option to purchase Defendants equity on
the occurrence of any of the above contingencies in the
event defendant does not purchase plaintiff's equity,
said equity to be based on an appraisal and
determination as of the date of the occurrence of one
of the above contingencies. In the event neither party
exercised the option to purchase, the home shall be
sold and Defendant shall receive the equity pursuant to
the Decree of Divorce and the present appraisal."
(R.21)
Mrs. Hatch stated in her Verified Motion to Clarify Decree
(R.57) that it was her understanding that Paragraph 5 of the
Decree, which dealt with the parties marital residence, contained
a standard clause that she would be granted use and possession
5

and assume the mortgage and continue to live in the marital
residence and had the first option to buy out Mr. Hatch in the
event one of the listed contingencies were triggered (R.57-64,
paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10 and 25) in accord with the
negotiations that had earlier occurred.

In addition, she stated

that she never would have agreed to a Stipulation that would not
have given her the first option to purchase Mr. Hatch 1 s equity
determined as of the date of the Decree if and when one of
the contingencies occurred.

Fa c ! sL_M^_.£ir £H51li^-££^_£H££2HI}^I2£-i^£
triggering o? the listed contingencies.

On February 2, 1981, and again on August 10, 1981, Mrs.
Hatch listed the parties* marital residence for sale (R.60,
paragraph 4 ) . A copy of these listings is included as
Exhibit "C" in the Addendum to this Brief.

She advised Mr. Hatch

of these listings (R.60, paragraph 12). However, Mr. Hatch never
made any attempt to exercise the option he claims existed in his
favor (R.60, paragraph 13).
On March 26, 1984, Mrs. Hatch married Terry Anderson and
again promptly notified Mr. Hatch of her second marriage (R.60,
paragraph 14). At no time following the notification of Mrs.
Hatch's marriage did Mr. Hatch attempt to serve any notice that
he wished to exercise his claimed option to purchase Plaintiff's
equity in the home (R.60; paragraphs 16-17).
On April 17, 1984, Mrs. Hatch made arrangements for a loan
to pay Mr. Hatch's equity and assume full title to the house and

6

advised him of such (R.61, paragraph 19), He refused her offer
of payment and would not sign a Quit Claim Deed on the property
(R.61, paragraph 19). On several occasions subsequent to her
first tender on April 17, 1984, Mrs. Hatch has requested Mr.
Hatch to accept her offer to purchase his interest in the home.
(R.61, paragraphs 20, 21, and 22). Mr. Hatch refused these
subsequent tenders and again refused to execute a Quit Claim Deed
(R.61, paragraphs 20, 21 and 22). At no time has Mr. Hatch
offered to purchase Mrs. Hatch's equity in the residence as he
claims he is entitled to do (R.61, paragraphs 20 and 21).
Facts and circumstances surrounding

_t he__p o£t^2iH^®B^Hl_P£££££^i5£l •
Because of Mr. Hatch's refusals to accept payment on his
equity from Mrs. Hatch, Mrs. Hatch filed an Order to Show Cause
to compel Mr. Hatch to accept her tender on April 9, 1985.
was scheduled for May 7, 1985 (R.42-43).

It

In response, Mr. Hatch

filed a Motion for Clarification of Decree of Divorce (R.45).
The Court's file on this matter is confusing in that there is no
notice of a May 7, 1985 hearing.

Apparently there was a

scheduled hearing on the Motion for Clarification of Decree set
for May 9, 1985, but that specific hearing was stricken and both
parties were not in attendance (R.46).
At the May 7, 1985, hearing on Defendant's Motion, the
Domestic Relations Commissioner took the matter under advisement
(R.49).
Mrs. Hatch's former counsel withdrew on July 19, 1985,

7

(R.50) at which time she retained her present counsel, Frank
Pignanel1i,
Mr. Pignanelli contacted Commissioner Peuler in the early
summer of 1985 and requested that some disposition needed to be
made of Mrs. Hatch's Order to Show Cause and Mr. Hatch's Motion
for Clarification.

A letter advising Mr. Hatch's counsel of

these discussions was sent to him in August of 1985. (See Exhibit
"D" included in the addendum to this Brief). On August 23, 1985,
Commissioner Peuler recommended that the Order to Show Cause
should be denied as no evidence was presented to show that
Defendant failed to exercise his option (R.51).

In her

recommendation, Commissioner Peuler makes no mention of
Defendant's Motion for Clarification.

Either the Commissioner

generally dismissed all matters before her, or the motion still
remains unresolved.

Commissioner Peuler also stated that

counsel should advise if a special setting on the matter was
necessary (R.51).
Mr. Pignanelli filed a Notice of Appearance of Counsel for
Mrs. Hatch on September 16, 1985, (R.54) and then filed a
Verified Motion to Compel Defendant to Execute a Quit Claim Deed
and Request for Clarification of the Decree (R.57).

Attached to

the Verified Motion was a copy of the Original Stipulation
submitted by Mrs. Hatch's first counsel (R.66-67), and copies of
documents which reflected Mrs. Hatch's attempt to sell the home
in 1981 (R.68-69).

The Motion was heard on September 30, 1985,

and Commissioner Peuler made the following recommendation:
8

That the intent of the decree, as evidenced by the
stipulation, was that the defendant was to receive the
1/2 share of his equity based upon the amount of the
equity existing at the time of the decree. He was
to receive that amount either at such time as Plaintiff
exercised an option to purchase his equity, or upon the
occurrence of one of the contingencies listed. If the
defendant purchased Plaintifffs share of equity, her
equity was to be determined as of the date of the
cont ingency.
That the prior recommendation is affirmed. (R.76)
On October 3, 1985, Mr. Hatch filed an objection to
Commissioner PeulerTs recommendation (R.80) and a hearing was
scheduled before the Honorable David B. Dee on November 6, 1985
(R.84).

On October 9, 1985, counsel for Defendant, apparently

presented an Order upon hearing the PlaintiffTs Order to Show
Cause which reflected Commissioner PeulerTs first recommendation
in this matter denying Mrs. Hatch's Order to Show Cause (R.80).
(A copy of this Order is included in the Addendum to this Brief
and marked Exhibit " E " ) . Even though Plaintiff's new counsel had
both submitted a Notice of Appearance of Counsel, and had in fact
appeared in Court representing Mrs. Hatch in this matter, no copy
of this Order was sent to Mr. Pignanelli (R.80).

The mailing

certificate states only that a copy of this Order was sent to
Mrs. Hatch, but not Mr. Pignanelli.
At the November 6, 1985 hearing, counsel for both parties
presented argument to the court and submitted documents and
Affidavits in support of their respective positions.

At no time

during the course of the argument before Judge Dee was a court
reporter requested by Mr. Hatch's counsel and the proceeding was

9

not reported.

Judge Dee took the matter under advisement and

later advised counsel that he would affirm Commissioner Peuler's
recommendation in favor of Mrs. Hatch.
Mrs. Hatch1s counsel then submitted proposed Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law and an Order. Mr. Hatch1s counsel
then objected to the proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law and those objections were heard on March 19, 1986 (R.90-92).
Judge Dee ruled that a Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,
were not necessary in connection with the respective Motions and
that he would sign Mr. Pignanellifs proposed Order which
reflected his affirmation of Commissioner Peuler's recommendation
(R.93-95).

A copy of that Order is included as Exhibit "F" in

the Addendum to this Brief.

It is from this Order which

Defendant, Mr. Hatch appeals (R.96).
No transcript of any of the above hearings was made nor has
Appellant presented a statement of evidence or proceedings as
provided in Rule 11(g) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
SUM^^Y_OF_^GUMENTS
POINT I
Other than the Trial Courts file, there is no record or
transcript of the proceedings below.

At no time during these

proceedings did Appellant request a transcript.

Absent a

transcript, this Court in equity cases will not make its own
factual determination and will presume that the Trial Court's
decision is correct.

10

POINT_II_
The Decree of Divorce signed and entered in this matter
states that Mrs. Hatch was awarded the use of the parties'
marital residence and that she was responsible from that point
forward for all mortgage payments on the residence.

Since the

date of the Decree, Mrs. Hatch has faithfully paid those mortgage
payments, in addition to making substantial improvements on the
home.

Mr. Hatch suggests that he is entitled to one-half of the

equity existing upon the occurrence of one of the listed
contingencies regardless of the date of that occurrence.
Such a result is contrary to the intent of the parties that
Mr. Hatch receive one-half of the equity existing at the time of
the Decree of Divorce.

The Trial Court has both the discretion

and the responsibility to make fair and equitable interpretations
of its Decrees in divorce matters.

Such was the result in this

case.
P02NT_rn
Appellant, argues that the doctrine of res lH^i£^l£ bars
Mrs. Hatch from receiving the relief granted by the Trial Court.
Mr. Hatch asserts that the Order on Order to Show Cause signed by
Judge Dee on October 9, 1985, effectively resolves the issues
contained in Mrs. Hatch1 Verified Motion which was heard
September 30, 1985.
Rule 2.9(b) of the Rules of Practice in the District and
Circuit Courts of Utah requires that the party submitting an
Order to a Judge for signature is required to submit a copy of
11

that Order to the opposing counsel before it is signed by the
Court.

Counsel for Mr. Hatch clearly did not do this and as a

result, is in violation of Rule 2.9(b).

In the absence of a

final judgment, the doctrine of res> iudi_cat^a cannot be invoked.
Also, Rule 8(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provide
that any party responding to a pleading of another party must
affirmatively set forth the defense of res judicata.

Mr. Hatch

failed to do this and thus is barred from now asserting the
defense on appeal.
PO^NT^^V
Mr. Hatch claims that Mrs. Hatch did not satisfy the
evidentiary burdens related to a Petition for Modification of
Decree of Divorce.

Mrs. Hatch never filed a Petition for

Modification of Decree of Divorce; rather the Order on appeal is
the Order on Mrs. Hatch's Verified Motion to Compel Defendant to
Execute Quit Claim Deed and for Clarification of the Decree of
Divorce.

Therefore, any of the burdens of proof, case law and

statutory requirements of the party seeking relief by a Petition
for Modification of Decree of Divorce are not applicable to Mrs.
Hatch.

POJ:NT_V
Because Appellant's claims are without merit and Respondent
has been required to defend this appeal, she should be awarded
her attorney's fees and costs in connection with this appeal.

12

ARGUMENT

E21*?LJL
APPELLANTS FAILURE TO PROVIDE A TRANSCRIPT OF THE
PROCEEDINGS BELOW PRECLUDES ADDITIONAL
FACTUAL DETERMINATIONS OR ASSUMPTIONS AND THE
TRIAL COURT'S DECISION MUST BE AFFIRMED
Mr. Hatch1s Objection to the Domestic Commissioner's
recommendation came before Judge Dee on November 6, 1985.

The

Court requested the parties to state their respective positions
and each submitted copies of motions filed (R.57), affidavits
(R.20, R.66, 68, 69), and supporting documents.

No objection to

the procedure was made by Appellant nor did he request that the
proceedings be reported.
This Court has consistently held that a transcript of the
proceedings below is prerequisite for a determination of the
factual matters before it.

In MjUchej_J._v^JMiJ:che^j_, 527 P.2d

1359 (Utah, 1974), the Defendant appealed from an Order of the
Trial Court which modified a previous Decree of Divorce.
In refusing to alter the Trial Court's ruling, this Court
stated:
. . .in a divorce action, the Trial Court has a
considerable latitude of discretion in adjusting
financial and property interests, and its actions are
indulged with a presumption of validity. The burden is
upon appellant to prove that the evidence is clearly
preponderate against the findings as made; or there was
a misunderstanding or misapplication of the law
resulting in substantial and prejudicial error; or a
serious inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear
abuse of discretion. Id. at 1360.
After establishing the Appellant's burden and obligations in
an appeal of a modification, the Court went on to say:
13

In the instant action, Defendant had not included in
the record on appeal a transcript of the hearing for
the Petition for Modification. Defendant's points on
appeal involve a factual determination which this Court
obviously cannot undertake without a transcript of the
hearing. The determination of the Trial Court that
there had been a substantial change of circumstances
which justified the increase of support and
maintenance, is presumed valid. Id. at 1360-1361.
The Court, in Sawyers^v^^Sawyers, 558 P.2d 607 (Utah, 1976),
directly reaffirmed the holding in MjJ^chen_.

In Sawyers;, the

Defendant also appealed from a Trial Court's decision to modify
the previous Decree of Divorce, and no copy of the transcript of
the hearing was included in the record on appeal, nor was an
abstract of the testimony presented for the Supreme Court's
consideration.

All the Court had before it was the brief each

party submitted in support of their respective arguments.
The Court stated that:
Defendant's contentions and points on this appeal
involve factual matters which this Court cannot resolve
or undertake to determine without a transcript of the
testimony. Id. at 608.
The Court then held:
Appellate review of factual matters can be meaningful,
orderly, and intelligent only in juxtaposition to a
record by which lower court's rulings and decisions on
disputes can be measured. In this case, without a
transcript, no such record was available, and,
therefore, no measurement of the District Court's
actions can be made as urged upon us by the Defendant.
And, as under elementary principles of Appellate
review, we '. . . presume the findings of the Court to
have been supported by admissible, competent, and
substantial evidence. . .' we affirm. Id. at 608-609.
The principle that without a transcript the Trial Court's
actions are presumed valid was again reaffirmed by this Court in

14

Bagna^^v^^SuburMa^Land^Company, 579 P.2d 917 (Utah, 1978), and

?£X£E«X-^£^j_^2Mi£H£ii2B^2[BE£BZj.«l2£^'

66S p

- 2d

442

(Utah,

19 8 3) and finally, in Bennj.on y. LeGrandJohmson Construction
Company, 701 P.2d 1078 (Utah, 1985).
Counsel for Mr. Hatch had every opportunity at the November
6, 1985 hearing to request the presence of a court reporter.
Thus, this Court does not have the advantage of the transcript of
those proceedings undertaken below.

Therefore, the record on

appeal is marginally helpful at best and leaves much to
speculation and supposition.

The cases cited above compel this

Court to summarily dispose of Mr. Hatch's appeal and affirm the
decision of the Trial Court and Domestic Commissioner below.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN
ITS INTERPRETATION OF PARAGRAPH 5 OF
THE DECREE OF DIVORCE
Appellant has asked this Court to disregard the
recommendation of the Domestics Commissioner and the decision of
the Trial Court because he claims the issues of fairness and
equity are not involved.

That is simply not the case.

Mrs. Hatch stated in her Verified Motion (R.57) that she
requested her former counsel include in the Stipulation a
provision that she, as the mother assuming custody of the
parties' minor child and as the party assuming possession of the
residence and the payment of the mortgage on the residence, would
have the right to purchase Mr. Hatch's equity in an amount equal
to one-half the equity existing at the time of the Decree
15

of Divorce.

She would have that right upon the happening of the

earliest of three contingencies.
Appellant argues that he is entitled to one-half of the
equity as of the date of the first occurrence of the listed
contingencies.

The Decree was entered in 1975, the first listing

occurred in 1981.

This would mean that Mrs. Hatch intended that

after years of paying the mortgage payment, and after paying
substantial sums improving and maintaining the home, she would
automatically forfeit one-half of these amounts to her former
husband.

Certainly, the Stipulation as incorporated into the

Decree of Divorce never contemplated such a result.

Indeed, the

last sentence of Paragraph 5 states that if neither party
exercises the option to purchase, the home would be sold and the
Defendant shall receive his equity which existed at the time of
the Decree of Divorce.
If the language contained in Paragraph 5 of the Decree of
Divorce is ambiguous as to the amount of equity due Mr. Hatch,
then the Trial Court has the discretion to interpret and clarify
the terms of this Stipulation and the Decree of Divorce.
Land v. Land, 605 P.2d 1258 (Utah, 1980)).

(See

The interpretation of

Paragraph 5, as suggested by Mr. Hatch, is inherently unfair to
Mrs. Hatch.

Therefore, under general principles of equity

attributable to divorce actions, the Trial Court was, in fact,
required to exercise its discretion in interpreting that
paragraph in a fair and equitable manner, which it did, even if a
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Stipulation has been on file.

(See DeBry^v^DeBry, 496 P.2d 92

(Utah, 1972)),
In so doing, it granted the relief sought by Mrs. Hatch in
her Verified Motion to Compel Defendant to Execute Quit Claim
Deed and Request Clarification of Decree.

Without resorting to a

modification of the Decree of Divorce, the Trial Court used the
wide discretion afforded it in divorce actions and entered an
Order which correctly interpretated Paragraph 5 of the Decree in
accord with the true intentions of the parties.

Appellant has

shown no abuse of discretion which, in any way, would justify a
reversal or modification of the Trial CourtTs decision.

APPELLANT'S ACTIONS IN THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW
EFFECTIVELY BAR HIM FROM ASSERTING THE DEFENSE OF
RES JUDICATA AGAINST THE RESPONDENT
A.
APPELLANT FAILED TO SUBMIT THE PROPOSED ORDER
ON THE FIRST RECOMMENDATION OF THE DOMESTICS COMMISSIONER
TO RESPONDENT'S COUNSEL AND IS, THEREFORE,
BARRED FROM ASSERTING DEFENSE OF RES JUDICATA
Appellant asserts that the Order denying Respondent's Order
to Show Cause signed by Judge Dee on October 9, 1985, is res
judicata and prevents Respondent from requesting relief asked for
in her Motion to Compel Defendant to Execute Quit Claim Deed and
for Clarification of the Decree of Divorce.
Counsel for Mrs. Hatch never received a copy of this Order and
never knew that this Order had ever been presented to and signed
by the Court.

The mailing certificate clearlv states that the
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copy of the Order was sent only to Gayla Hatch a/k/a Gayla Hatch
Anderson at her residence.

(A copy of this Order is included in

the Addendum to this Brief and is marked Exhibit "E".
The question before this Court is not whether Mrs. Hatch
received a copy of this Order, but whether counsel for Mr. Hatch
complied with Rule 2.9(b) of the RujLes^_o^_Pract_jLce_jLn_t_he
5ili£l£i^2i-.2il£Hii«5£H£il-2l-_Uii^•

R

ule 2.9(b) requires,

Copies of the proposed Judgment, Findings and/or Order
must be served on opposing counsel before being
presented to the court for signature, unless the Court
otherwise orders. Notice of Objections thereto shall
be submitted to the Court and Counsel within (5) days
after service.
In BigeJ_ow_v^__^ngerso^J. , 618 P.2d 50, (Utah, 1980), the
Court established that a judgment does not exist unless the
requirements of 2.9(b) have been met.

In Bigelow, the Trial

Court's judgment was signed without first being served on opposing
counsel.

In concluding that this judgment was not valid, this

Court stated:
. . .compliance with Rule 2.9(b) is necessary in order
that a judgment be properly "filed", as that term is
used in Rule 58A(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Id.
at 52.
The holding in Bj_g<e^ow, £upra, was likewise followed in

2£ll£_Xj._5j.^_§i£^££i-5£E£^£Z>

717 p

- 2d

697

< u t a h > 1986),

. . .unless Rule 2.9(b) of the District and Circuit
Court Rules of Practice has been complied with, the
judgment in question is not deemed "filed" within the
meaning or Rule 58A(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure and a time for taking an appeal from that
judgment under Rule 73(a). . .does not begin to run
if a judgment has not been properly "entered". Id. at
699.
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A final judgment is necessary for the assertion of res;
j^ud^catja as a bar to relitigation of an issue already tried and
in this case the Order upon which Mr, Hatch relies was not
"final" as that term has been interpreted by this Court,

As was

stated in K°°£_YjL_5°i*l, 602 P. 2d 1128, (Court of Appeals Oregon,
1979):
The rules of res* lH5*I£ata a r e n o t applicable with a
judgment that Is not a TTnal judgment." Koos;, Id. at
1130 (citing Restatements and Judgments, §41 (1942)).
Mr. Hatch's assertion that the defense of res judicata would
bar Mrs. Hatch's claim as determined by the Trial Court is simply
without merit.
B.
APPELLANT'S FAILURE TO PROPERLY PLEAD AND
APPLY THE DEFENSE OF RES JUDICATA IN THE PROCEEDINGS
BELOW BAR ITS USE AS A DEFENSE
TO PLAINTIFF'S MARCH 6, 1986, JUDGMENT.
At no time prior to the filing of this appeal did Mr. Hatch,
by pleading or otherwise, raise the defense of resi j_u<Hcata.

The

limited record before the Court is clear on that point.
Rule 8(c) of the U^ah^Ru^e^o^C^v^^Procedure provides that
in pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall set forth
affirmatively the defense of r£ss judicata.

In surrounding

jurisdictions, this policy has also been upheld.

In Crocker_y^

Colorado Department of^Revenue , Mot^or VehicleDivision, 6 5 2 P. 2d
1068 (Colo., 1982), the Appellee, for the first time on appeal,
asserted the doctrine of res iH^i£ a i a
consideration of the proceedings.

as

a

bar

on

further

The Colorado Supreme Court

stated that Rule 8 of the CoJ^orado^Ru^e^o^C^v^^Procedure,
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which is similar to Rule 8 of the Ujt ah^RuJ^e^o^CJ^v^^ Procedure,
provides that:
?£^ lH^i££l- * s a n affirmative defense to a claim of
an opposing party and must be set forth affirmatively
in a responsive pleading by the party relying on the
defense, . . failure to plead an affirmative defense as
required by Rule 8(c) and failure to present any
evidence or argument on the matter in district court,
preclude us from reviewing the issue. Id. at 1071
Thus, both the Ut ah Ruj^es of C^vj^j. Procedure, and the
general rule of the surrounding jurisdictions, preclude Mr. Hatch
from asserting the defense of res; judicata when he failed to
raise this in the proceedings below.

Issues raised for the first

time on appeal will not be considered by the reviewing court.
Trayner_ v^_Cu s* hj_ng, 688 P.2d 754 (Utah, 1984); Combe_v^_Warren^s
Zi[DiIy-5liX£zi!l£-L-l!l£_L>

680

p

-2d

733

(Utah, 1984).

POJ[NT_I_V
APPELLANTS CLAIM THAT RESPONDENT HAS MADE
A MOTION FOR MODIFICATION OF DECREE OF DIVORCE IS
INAPPLICABLE AND WITHOUT MERIT
In Point III of his brief, Mr. Hatch is confused when he
states that Mrs. Hatch requested the Trial Court to modify the
original Decree.

Mrs. Hatch never sought a modification of the

original Decree.

She simply requested that Mr. Hatch be

compelled to accept payment of his equity and in return execute a
Quit Claim Deed in her favor.

She also requested the Trial Court

clarify the rights of the parties under Paragraph 5 of the
Decree.

That was the request made at the September 30, 1985,

hearing before the Domestics Commissioner and at the November 6,
1985 hearing before Judge Dee.

The arguments in Appellant!s
20

Brief related to this modification issue are simply inappropriate
and misplaced,
PO]NT_V
RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF HER
ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH THIS APPEAL
No error has been shown to have been commited and Mr.
Hatch*s appeal of the Trial courts' decision is without merit.
When an appeal is shown to be without merit, the Respondent has
the right to request this Court to award her attorney's fees
associated with the appeal.
Ca£i££__X^-Caii££»

584

p

-2d

904

As this Court properly concluded in
(Utah, 1978):

However, the defendant argues that inasmuch as the
plaintiff was unwilling to abide by the trial court's
judgment, and that she has been put to the necessity of
defending this appeal, the plaintiff should have to
bear the costs thereof, including reasonable attorney?s
fees for her counsel. We agree with the reasonableness
and propriety of her requst. Id. at 906.
See also Ehni^nge£_v^_Ehn_j_nger , 569 P. 2d 1104 (Utah, 1977).
Fairness requires that Respondent not be required to deplete her
limited assets in demonstrating that this appeal is without
merit.

She requests this Court to remand to the Trial Court for

determination an award of her attorney1s fees and costs
associated with this appeal.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Hatch asks this Court to second guess the factual
determination and decision of the Trial Court without the benefit
of a transcript of the proceedings below.

The Supreme Court has

consistently held that unless a transcript is available, it will
not consider disturbing the orders of a lower court.
21

Mr. Hatch

never requested a court reporter.

On this basis alone, the

decision of the Trial Court should not be disturbed.
The Trial Court acted with fairness and equity in its
interpretation of Paragraph 5 of the Decree.

The Appellant has

shown no abuse of discretion by the Trial Court in its ruling as
to rights and obligations of the parties under the Decree of
Divorce.
Appellant's failure to send Mrs. Hatch's counsel a copy of
the proposed October 9, 1985 order violated the provisions of
Rule 2.9 of the Local Rules of Practice.

Consequently, no final

Order was entered and without a final Order, the defense of res

lH^i£^l£ *s *naPPlicable.
The defense of res lH^I£^l£
until the filing of his Brief.

was

no

* raised by Mr. Hatch

As a result, Appellant Hatch and

is prohibited from raising this issue for the first time on
appeal.
Any claims or defenses Appellant raises in his Brief in
regard to the burden a moving party has in a modification of a
Decree of Divorce are inapplicable.

Mrs. Hatch requested the

Trial Court to compel Mr. Hatch to accept payment of his lien
on the marital residence.

She also requested only a

clarification of Paragraph 5 of the the Decree visT avis1 the
Settlement Agreement, not a modification.
The decision of the Domestics Commissioner and the Trial
Court should be affirmed in all respects and Respondent should be
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awarded her costs and attorneyTs fees related to this appeal.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this j/_7_ day of November, 1986.
GUSTIN, ADAMS, K£S3^NG & LIAPIS

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that four true and correct copies of the
above and foregoing Brief of Respondent was hand delivered to:
Gordon A.
Robert C.
Leland K.
320 South
Salt Lake
DATED this

Madsen
Cummings
Wimmer
300 East
City, Utah

84111

day of November
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UOUA J. OLSEW
ACtara*y for Plaintiff
8133 South StAta Straot
Midvala, Utah 14047
153,7176
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EXHIBIT "AT

I* THX DISTRICT COJJLT OF TU£ TUIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT* W AXD FOR
SALT UXX COUNTY, STATS Of UTAH

CAYLA HATCH,

STIPULATION

Plalmtiff,

HICHAXL HALL HATCH,
Civil Ho* 0.11595
Dafa&dant*

It i s hmraby •tlpttlatad and atraad by tad batvaan plaintiff and
defandaat partoaally and tbalr raspactlva oogaul 4J follows i
!•

Da f and ant haraby conaaats tha* his dafault ba tatarad la chit

action by tha court, and valvas hli ippaaranca la aaid action*

Dtftndant

furthar vaivaa tha mlaaty (^0) day waiting pariod and tha thraa (3) aouch
int«riocutary pariod following tha groatlag of tha Dacraa ha rain.
2*

Plaintiff ahall tharaupon praaant avidanca to tha court In

tup pert of tha al ligations of har Ccaaplaiat on flla haxaio*

If tha court

daaau ouch arlianaa mf f i d ant to award to plaintiff a Dacraa of Divorco IX<M
dafaadaat, than aaid Dacraa, aubjact to tha approval of tha court, ihall
provida aa foilovit
k*

Plaintiff may ba avardad tha car a, cuatody and control of th«

tvo nlaor ahlUrao of tha partlaa, to-witi

J anas Craig Uatch and Vantita >u>

Hatch, aubjact ta tha right of raaaoaabla v i s i t a t i o n s by tha dafaadant.
b*

Plaintiff say ba *ux4*d tha usa of tha bona and raal proparty

l&catad at U227 tawth 2*60 Uast, l i w t o n , Utah, aubjact U tha paymaac ol
th« nortgaga tharaom, tsntil tha ocotxrranca of ona of tha following contlngonc
tcuviti

tha raaarrtaga of plaintiff,

tha jouagait child raae'vet majority* o:

plaLntlff daslrat to aall aaid bona, at which tlma plaintiff ahall hav«
f i r s t optic* to purchaaa dafandant's acuity pursuant to an appraisal to b«
»•*!• forthwith to datamlna tha acuity aa of thla data, aaid appraisal to

0Q00G6

bo polo fox V7 ooftodoott mad dofoadont »holl hovo tho option to purchaso
p i t l o t i f f f oojoity OQ tho ooouxronco of «ry of tho obovo cottdtt|<ncUi la 1
ovoat pioiotiff doot not ouxxhAoo doftadoat'f oa^iity, ft^id Huity to bo b*j
00 o* cpproiiol ond dotormiuotion 00 of tin doto of tho occurroaeo of on* c
t h o ObOVC OMUlAJtCTULltt*

I * t h o OVOQt O o l t h o r pOXtJ t X * t X l t f t h o OOtlon tC

purtrha—«toid hoo* vould bo told cod defend ant von Id rocolvo tho tquicy
purouoat to tho Docxoo of Diverco and tho pro n o t oyproiftoi*
c#

F U U t i f f aoy bo ovordod *o hox t o l l ond soptroto proporcy tt

furolturo, f*Tmiohifl*t omd flrt*rot, tbt 1970 Wick Rivioxo outonobilt tnd
ptrooaol bo 10041*4 ••
4*

Dofoadoat moj bo tiirdoi o« hit 00U end otpffftU pxoooxty ck

1964 Dodgo pickvp oad hit poxsoool boiominfi«
o«
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hoxmioM thoxotroou
f»

Dofoadant iholl ho oxdorod to poy to p loin t i f f tho tun of

U30.00 pox ahiU pox •oath, # totoi of $300*00 pox aoath, for tho oupport
oad aolatoaoaco of tho two aiaox childroa of tho portios*
g«

Hoimtiff thjkii ho ovoxdod ao aliaoay,

h*

Dofoadoat tholl ho ordoxod to aoiatoia nodtcol iaourtaco on

tho aiaox chilaxo* oad aoiatoia hii protoat l i f t iaouronio aoalat tho ainor
chiidxoa 00 hoaoiltiorlos thox+oa*
i«

OoiooWont s k i l l ho oxdoxod to poy $330*00 odditioool ottoraoy

fooj to p U U t i f f ' t coomool hoxoia.
OaTXD this

d«y of

, 1973.
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NUUJT J. OlJry, UUamy

lor fl*L*tlll
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EXWBjT.

w

J' • ^ /

L E L A N D K. W I M M E R
*-Attorney for Defendant
1 ~-*
600 Utah Savings Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 533-0538
******************************************** *****
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DIST RICT,
IN A N D F O R S A L T L A K E C O U N T Y , S T A T E O F U T A H

GAYLA HATCH,
plaintiff,
STIPULATION
- vs-

Civil No.

MICHAEL HALL HATCH,
defendant.

D- 13898

*************************************************
Plaintiff and defendarthereby stipulate and agree together with thei
respective attorneys, subject to the approval of the Court, as follows:
1. Defendant hereby consents that his default be entered in this ac
by the court, and waives his appearance in said action.and consent that
plaintiff proceed to a hearing upon her complaint in accordance with the
ing t e r m s .
2.

j

Plaintiff shall thereupon present evidence to the court in suppo

the allegations of her complaint on file herein.

If the court deems such

evidence sufficient to award to plaintiff a Decree of Divorce from defend
then said Decree, subject to the approval of the court, shall provide as
follows:
a.

Plaintiff may be awarded the c a r e , custody and control of the t

minor children of the parties, to-wit: J a m e s Craig Hatch and Vanessa K
Hatch, subject to the right of reasonable visitations by the defendant.
b.

Plaintiff may be awarded the use of the home and real property

located at 13227 South 28C0 West, Riverton, Utah, subjea to the paymen
the mortgage thereon, until the occurrence of one of the following contir
gencies, to-wit: The r e m a r r i a g e of plaintiff, the youngest child reache:
majority, or plaintiff d e s i r e s to sell said home, at which time defendanl
shall have first option to purchase plaintiff's equity pursuant to an apprs
to be made forthwith to determine the equity as of this date, said apprai
to be paid for by defendant, and plaintiff shall have thcoption to purchas
defendant's equity on the occurrence of any of the above contingencies ir

GrOv^-

ij event defendant does not purchase plaintiff's equity, said equity to be based

|j

I; on an a p p r a i s a l and determination as of the date of the occurrence of one of
it

j'l the above contingencies.
I

In the event neither party e x e r c i s e s the option to

i!

I1 purchase, said home would be sold and defendant would receive the equity

i|
il pursuant to the Decree o^ Divorce and the present appraisal.
j! .

c.

Plaintiff may be awarded as her sole and separate property the

i| furnityre, furnishings and fixtures, the 1970 Buick Riviera automobile and
II her personal belongings.
i

d.

Defendant may be awarded as his sole and separate property the

ij

jj 11368 Dodge pickup and his personal belongings and the personal property in-

!i
i|

his possession and control.
I
e. Plaintiff shall be ordered to assume and discharge the obligation

li

;' F a r m Home Administration on the mortgage on the home; and defendant sha

ij

li be ordered to assume and discharge all other debts and obligations as set

jj

jj forth by the divorce Complaint, as well as any and all other debts and oblij

|i
ji tions incurred prior to filing of this divorce, by the parties during their
! marriage.
li

f.

Defendant shall be ordered to pay to plaintiff the sum of $100.00 f

I child per month, for the support and maintenance of the two minor childre

1
jj of the p a r t i e s .
|j
g. Defendant shall be ordered to maintain medical insurance on the

i!
i minor children and maintain his present life insurance naming the minor
I
:! children as beneficiaries thereon, through operation engineers so long as
|i

|j defendant is elegable to do so.
ii
h. Plaintiff shall be awarded no alimony.
i

!

i.

Plaintiff a g r e e s to continue existing m a r r i a g e counseling.

!j

j . Each party shall assume and pay their own attourney fees and co

i; COStS.
j!

jl
i

..

DATED tins

C-&v

clay of

A^^j^rj^fajs

1975

GAYLA HATCH, Plaintiff

NOLAN" J. OLSEN,
Attorney for Plaintiff

Sfr/z*/**'

<t

%«•>

MICHAEL HALL HATCH, Defendant

LELAND K. WIMMER,
Attorney for Defendant
Utah Savings Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah
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CUSTIN. ADAMS. KASTINC 6 LIAPIS
A PROFf S S I O N A L C O R P O R A T I O N

A T T O R N E Y S AT LAW
f . ^ N K J. CUSTIN
J O H N S. ADAMS

r

KENT M. KASTINC

F L Q O R >

N £ W

Y O R K

B U | L D | N C

HARLEYW. CUSTIN
1902-1977

48 POST OFFICE PLACE

PAUL H. LIAPIS
DEAN L. CRAY

SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84101

WILLIAM A. STECALL, JR.
DAVID W. OVERHOLT
SHARON A. D O N O V A N
FRANK R. PICNANELLI

TELEPHONE (801) 5 3 2 - 6 9 9 6

September 13, 1985

Leyland K. Wimmer, Esq.
Attorney at Law
604 Judge Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
RE:

Gayla Hatch Anderson v. Michael H. Hatch

Dear Leyland:
As you may have noted from the messages I have left at your
office, Gayla Anderson has retained this office to represent her
in the current controversy surrounding the divorce proceedings
with your client. My initial discussion occurred about a week
after the May 7, 1985 hearing in this matter. Subsequent to that
meeting, I attempted on several occasions to contact Nolan Olsen,
Gayla Anderson's previous counsel, as to what the current status
of the case was. For some reason, Nolan Olsen refused to return
any of my telephone calls and I was forced to search the court
records for an answer.
After waiting several weeks for the file to be returned to
the archives, I discovered that the file was located either with
Commissioner Peuler or with Commissioner Peulerfs clerk, Donna
Baldwin. Eventually, Commissioner Peuler was able to track down
the file and she, in turn, contacted me regarding such, since it
was I who requested current information as to the status of the
file.
In that discussion with Commissioner Peuler, I expressed to
her all that I really wanted at that point in time was an up-date
on the status of the case so that I could then make my
recommendations to my client. Commissioner Peuler suggested she
be allowed time in which to make a decision as to what should be
done in this matter. In that light, I received, as I am sure you
did, her Memorandum Decision regarding Plaintiff's Motion for
Order to Show Cause.
I am concerned as to the type of representation Gayla Hatch
Anderson was given by Mr. Olsen at the May 7, 1985 hearing. As
you are aware, there is some controversy surrounding the final
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wording of the Decree of Divorce, and there is some evidence
pointing to the fact that my client may have already given your
client the option on the house when it was listed several years
ago. Because of these concerns, upon receipt of the Memorandum
Decision, I contacted Commissioner Peuler and asked her whether
it was proper to object to her decision or motion up another
Order to Show Cause, based upon additional evidence.
Commissioner Peuler suggested the latter route as the most
effective. Therefore, I have scheduled an Order to Show Cause
hearing for Monday, September 30th at 2:00 p.m. in front of
Commissioner Peuler. I am currently in the process of collecting
the necessary information to complete the affidavits and
documents for this Order to Show Cause, and I will be sending
them to your office shortly.
If you have any problems or concerns with the items I have
detailed above, please feel free to contact me.
Very truly yours,
GUSTIN, ADAMS, KASTING & LIAPIS

FRANK R. PIGNANELLI
FRP/mla

LELAND K . W I M4/L£fc* .&*•§ frp\ ~1
Attorney for Defendant
"""-^'^/
604 Judge Building
'^
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 533-0538
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIALJDISTRICT,
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE C O U N T Y , STATE OF UTAH

GAYLA HATCH,
plaintiff,

ORDER UPON HEARING OF
PLAINTIFF'S ORDER TO SHOW

-vs-

CAUSE
MICHAEL HALL HATCH,
defendant.

Civil No, 18898

Plaintiff's Order to Show Cause came on for hearing before the
Honorable Sandra Peuler, Commissioner on the 9th day of May A. D. 1985.
Parties were present and represented by each of their respective attorneys
of record. After arguments of counsel and review of the file the Court
being fully advised in the matter now on motion of Leland K. Wimmer i t
hereby

ordered

is

that the relief requested by plaintiff's Order to Show

Cause be denied.
DATED this
By t h e

day oUfagust-A.D. 1985

Court,
Recomme
Sandra Peuler, Commissioner

EXHIBIT.
ATTEST
Mailing Certificate

H. DIXON HiNT^vty

Qy^^fc^^UAk

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct; copy'oFfKe'foreaotngOrder Upon Hearing of Plaintiff's Order to Show C a u s e to Gayla Hatch a / k / a
Gayla Hatch Anderson at 13227 South 2860 W e s t , Rlverton, Utah 84065.
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GUSTIN, ADAMS, KASTING & LIAPIS
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Third Floor, New York Building
48 Post Office Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 532-6996
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
GAYLA HATCH ANDERSON,
O R D E R
Plaintiff,
v.
MICHAEL HALL HATCH,

Civil No. D-18898

Defendant.

Judge Dee
ooOoo

Defendant's Objection to Commissioner Sandra Peuler's
September 30, 1985, Memorandum Decision in the above-entitled
matter having come on regularly for hearing on November 6, 1985,
at 9:00 a.m., before the Honorable David B. Dee, one of the
Judges of the above-entitled Court, and Plaintiff appearing in
person and by and through her counsel, and Defendant having
appeared in person by and through his counsel, and the Court
having heard argument from counsel, and the Court being further
advised on the premises and upon the Motion of Frank R.
Pignanelli of GUSTIN, ADAMS, KASTING & LIAPIS, attorneys for
Plaintiff;
NOW THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS
FOLLOWS:

1.

That the intent of the Decree of Divorce entered by

this Court on November 21, 1975, as evidenced by the Stipulation,
is that the Defendant is to receive the one-half share of his
equity based upon the amount of equity existing at the time of
the Decree,
2.

That the Defendant is to receive his share of the

equity in the parties marital residence at such time as the
Plaintiff exercises the option to purchase Defendant's share of
the equity, or upon the occurrence of one of the contingencies
listed in Paragraph 5 of the Decree of Divorce.
3.

That if Defendant purchases Plaintiff's share of equity

in the parties marital residence, Plaintiff's equity is to be
determined as of the date of the occurrence of the listed
contingency in paragraph 5 of the Decree of Divorce.
4.

That the Recommendations contained in Commissioner

Peuler's September 30, 1985, Memorandum Decision in the
above-entitled matter are affirmed,
DATED this j ^

day of ^biud!T},

1986.

BY THE COURT:

B. D E E ^
D i s t r i c t Court Judge^ (H. DiXON nnjiOLEY

\}

[Vr,.,t*/ Clerk

